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Bernstein v. United States Department of Justice:
A Cryptic Interpretation of Speech
I. INTRODUCTION
Freedom of speech is essential to the preservation of free institutions and individual dignity. Without the debate inherent in a liberal
society, power coalesces around uncontested leadership, demagoguery replaces persuasion, and coercion supplants free exercise of conscience. The mere threat of such events engenders zealous protection
of free speech in America. Even after 230 years, modern Americans
have not forgotten the outrage kindled by the Stamp Act’s clumsy
suppression of speech.1 Nevertheless, despite fervent protection of
speech, even the most ardent advocate will concede the need for limits on activity protected under the First Amendment.
Certainly civilized society cannot endure the gamut of human activity and still retain a healthy balance between order and freedom. If
all behavior were protected speech, the resulting anarchy would inevitably destroy society and the protections it affords individuals. At
a rudimentary level, only that activity which is genuinely expressive
and does not violate others’ protected rights qualifies for free speech
protection. Successful protection of speech must balance the coexistent and interdependent needs for order and freedom. If a standard
of speech protection is overly burdensome (as was the Stamp Act),
then individuals suffer and may react violently. If a standard of
speech is overly concerned with freedom, then freedom itself is in
peril to the degree it is dependent on an ordered society. Determining the proper balance between social order and individual freedom
is not a precise science, especially in a rapidly changing society.
Recent technological advances have forced society to reevaluate
its standard of free speech. Among the many changes it has brought
to society, the computer revolution has compelled the courts to de-

1. See CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 95-98 (1944). The Stamp Act, among other things, regulated speech by requiring a
stamp on several types of papers and documents, including licenses to practice law, newspapers,
and other circulating publications. The lawyers and publishers, each of whom made their living
by the spoken and written word, were instrumental in rallying opposition to the Act. See id.
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termine whether or not encryption source code qualifies for First
Amendment free speech protection. An encryption program is a
computer program capable of scrambling and deciphering information. Computer operators using the same encryption program can
prevent unintended parties from accessing sensitive information. As
with other computer programs, encryption programs are written in
source code, using computer languages such as C+ or Cobalt. A
program’s source code must be “compiled” or translated into object
code, a series of ones and zeroes, before it can actually operate a
computer.
A determination that encryption source code is or is not protected speech involves complex policy decisions in a burgeoning
computer culture and forces us to ascertain how the first principles of
free speech will best be furthered. In the pivotal case Bernstein v.
United States Department of Justice,2 the Ninth Circuit decided that
encryption source code is protected free speech. This Note will focus
on why encryption source code is not speech within the purview of
the First Amendment and will advance a test distinguishing activity
that is primarily expressive from activity that is primarily functional.3
This test would protect only activity that is primarily expressive. Part
II.A explores the major purposes of free speech protection, Part II.B
reviews relevant Supreme Court precedent defining the contours of
free speech protection, and Part II.C presents pre-Bernstein cases
dealing with speech protection for encryption source code. Part III
presents the facts and reasoning of the principal case. Part IV argues
that the Bernstein decision is inconsistent with established free
speech precedent and that a test distinguishing unprotected functional activity from protected expressive activity is more consonant
with previous Supreme Court decisions and the underlying purposes
of free speech.

2. 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999).
3. In addition to making the determination that encryption source code was speech,
the Bernstein court addressed several other issues, including: whether the government had legitimate interests in imposing licensing restrictions on the export of encryption technology;
whether the licensing scheme was overly-broad in its application; and whether the licensing
scheme could withstand a facial challenge. See id. The only issue this Note addresses is whether
the court properly determined that encryption source code was speech. Other issues addressed
by the court are beyond the scope of this Note.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Purposes of Free Speech

This Note is not intended to be a comprehensive authority on
the multitudinous theories detailing the purposes of free speech.
However, a general understanding of a major dichotomy in free
speech theory will be useful in evaluating the benefits of the functional/expressive test advocated in this Note.
In academic circles, each free speech scholar seems to have his
own categorization of free speech theory and theorists. For example,
D.F.B. Tucker has identified two major groupings: (1) the “Functionalist Liberal Theories” which include the “Utilitarian Functionalism” theory (which includes theorists John Stuart Mill and Justice
Brandeis), the “Indirect Utilitarianism” theory (which includes theorists David Lyons, Thomas Emerson, and Frederick Schauer) and the
“Democratic Functionalism” theory (which includes theorist Alexander Meiklejohn); and (2) the “Deontological Liberal Theories”
which include the “Lockean Liberalism” theory (which includes
theorists John Locke, Hugo Black, and Chief Justice Burger), and
the “Rawlsian Alternative” theory (which includes theorists John
Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and Ronald Dworkin).4 On the other hand,
David A.J. Richards has identified the “Utilitarian Models” (which
include John Stuart Mill and Oliver Wendell Holmes), the “Perfectionist Models” (which include John Stuart Mill, Finnis, George, and
Haksar), the “Argument from Democracy” theory (which includes
John Hart Ely, Cass Sunstein, Owen Fiss, C. Edwin Baker, and Kent
Greenawalt), and finally “The Toleration Model” (which Richards
himself advocated).5 As one can see, each scholar has his own complicated method of classifying each theory and theorist. Because legal
reasoning rests upon free speech theory, a general treatment of prevailing theories is in order. For the purposes of this Note, two general groups of prevailing theories will be referred to as the utilitarian
theory and the libertarian theory.

4. See D.F.B. TUCKER, LAW, LIBERALISM, AND FREE SPEECH 9-42 (1985).
5. David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy, the Principle of Free Speech, and the
Politics of Identity, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 779, 788-803 (1999).
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1. The utilitarian theory: Free speech as a tool to advance democracy
and exchange ideas
In Roth v. United States,6 Justice Brennan, writing for the Supreme Court, stated: “The protection given speech and press was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.”7 Accordingly, speech is a utilitarian tool designed to promote democracy. John Stuart Mill, one of the best known proponents of the
utilitarian theory, also described how a community injury is avoided
when each individual is able to express his opinions freely: “[T]he
peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is
robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation . . . .”8 Similarly, Walter Lippmann, the twentieth century pundit, observed: “The right to speak freely is one of the necessary
means to the attainment of the truth. That, and not the subjective
pleasure of utterance, is why freedom is a necessity in the good society.”9 Alexander Meiklejohn, Robert Bork, Cass Sunstein, and Thomas Emerson have also advocated differing strands of utilitarian theory in support of free speech.10 The utilitarian view that free speech
preserves and perfects democratic institutions has had great impact
on twentieth century jurisprudence.11
2. The libertarian theory: Free speech as a protection of individual
liberty and self-expression
According to the libertarian theory, protection of speech is an
end in itself, one that secures dignity to each individual by protecting
his influence on society through expressive means. In Cohen v. California,12 Justice Harlan wrote:
6. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7. Id. at 484.
8. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND UTILITARIANISM, 19 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1992) (1859).
9. WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY, reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL
LIPPMANN at 193 (Clinton Rossiter & James Lare eds., Random House 1963).
10. See THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10–13 (Geoffrey R. Stone et. al. eds., 1999).
11. See John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First
Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49 (1996). McGinnis states, “the perfection of collective
democratic processes was the most important rationale for the expansion of free speech during
[the last fifty years]. . . .” Id. at 51.
12. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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The constitutional right of free expression . . . put[s] the decision
as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us,
in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a
more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief
that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.13

Similarly, John O. McGinnis, a professor at Cardozo Law
School, relied on James Madison and John Locke in support of an
interesting property-based view of freedom of speech:
Madison states that “[g]overnment is instituted to protect property
of every sort,” including, in Madison’s view, man’s property in his
“opinions and the free communication of them.” Thus, according
to the first principles of the father of the Bill of Rights, free speech
is not simply or even principally a means for sustaining a particular
form of government; to the contrary, protecting free speech and
other property rights is the end for which government is constituted.
....
. . . The only legitimate Lockean restrictions on the transmission
of information per se are those designed to prevent information
from being used to deprive others of their life or property by force
or fraud.14

Finally, David A.J. Richards stated:
[T]he significance of free expression rests on the central human capacity to create and express symbolic systems, such as speech, writing, pictures, and music. . . . Freedom of expression permits and
encourages the exercise of these capacities: it supports a mature individual’s sovereign autonomy in deciding how to communicate
with others . . . . In so doing, it nurtures and sustains the selfrespect of the mature person.
....

13. Id. at 24.
14. McGinnis, supra note 11, at 68, 86 (quoting James Madison, Property, NAT’L
GAZETTE (Mar. 27, 1792) reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266-68 (Robert
A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983)).
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The value of free expression, in this view, rests on its deep relation
to self-respect arising from autonomous self-determination without
which the life of the spirit is meager and slavish.15

These sources persuasively argue that individual expression is not
protected because it is useful to society but because self-expression is
essential to the good life. Even though the libertarian and utilitarian
theories caution against curtailing individual expression, the Supreme
Court has limited freedom of speech in several instances.
B. Judicial Limits on Freedom of Speech
Freedom of speech controversies represent the classic conflict between the minority and majority. Typically, the majority passes a law
restricting what the minority believes is its right to expression. The
courts, often regarded as guardians of minority rights, frequently invalidate the will of the majority because it infringes on the minority’s
freedom of speech. An example of great protection of an individual’s
right to speak is New York Times v. Sullivan,16 where the Supreme
Court held that individuals could legally express opinions about public figures that would normally be illegal under state defamation laws.
At the same time, the courts have not endorsed an absolute right to
expression. There are several instances where the judiciary, sensitive
to majority mores, has refused to protect what the minority argues is
its right to expression.
In cases involving “fighting words” and obscenity the courts
have held that the minority does not have a right to expression. The
Supreme Court has determined that “‘fighting’ words . . . are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”17 Similarly, in Miller v. California the Supreme Court held that
“obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”18 The
Court presented a test to determine obscenity:
15. David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court held that a public official cannot prevail on a
defamation action unless the defamatory material was published with actual malice. See id. at
279-80. Thus, speech targeting public officials is more protected than other speech which is
subject to traditional defamation principles.
17. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
18. 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (citations omitted).
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The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the
“average person, applying contemporary community standards”
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.19

As one can observe, these are situations where the judiciary is
sensitive to the majority will and limits the ability of individuals and
minorities to speak freely.
One area of Supreme Court case law has particular relevance to
encryption source code. This line of precedent is often referred to as
the “‘speech-conduct’ distinction” or the “expression-action dichotomy.”20 In O’Brien v. United States, the Supreme Court stated: “We
cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct
can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”21 Under this reasoning, activity must reach a certain level of expressiveness before it will qualify
as speech for First Amendment purposes. The Court reinforced this
point in City of Dallas v. Stanglin when it stated: “It is possible to
find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for example, walking down the street or meeting one’s
friends at the shopping mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient to
bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.”22
Under the Court’s analysis, activity peppered with elements of expression must reach a certain level of expressiveness before that activity will qualify for free speech protection. In another “speechconduct” case, Spence v. Washington, the Court found the activity at
issue expressive enough to qualify as speech because it evinced “[a]n
intent to convey a particularized message . . ., and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it.”23
Several principles emerge from the “speech-conduct” precedents.
In order to qualify as speech: (1) there must be more than the actor’s
19.
20.
1996).
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 209 (2nd ed.
391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
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mere intent to communicate an idea;24 (2) the activity must contain
more than a “kernel of expression;”25 and (3) the likelihood must be
great that those who experience the message will understand it.26
C. Pre-Bernstein Decisions
As one readily observes, different types of speech receive different
levels of protection. On a more fundamental level, if an activity is not
sufficiently expressive, the government can regulate that activity
without violating free speech rights. Recent technological advances
have forced courts to determine if encryption software is expression
meriting free speech protection or if it is activity that is not expressive enough to qualify as speech.
The exportation of encryption source code has been subject to
some form of licensing regulation since 1977.27 The primary purpose
of these licensing regulations has been to protect national security
interests by withholding encryption technology from organized
crime, espionage rings, and terrorists. The first case to address the
issue of whether encryption licensing regulations violated free speech
protections was Karn v. United States Department of State, 28 decided
in March of 1996.
1. Karn v. United States Department of State
Bruce Schneier authored a book on cryptography, which was
sold with an accompanying diskette, both of which contained an encryption source code. Philip Karn was interested in making money by
exporting these items and wanted to know whether he would need
an export license under the relevant International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR).29 After Karn petitioned, the State Department
concluded that the book was not subject to ITAR but the diskette
was. Karn appealed this determination to the Assistant Secretary of
State for Political Military Affairs, Thomas McNamara.30 McNamara
24. See O’Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
25. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
26. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
27. For a detailed history of the encryption exportation regulations, see Ryan Alan
Murr, Comment, Privacy and Encryption in Cyberspace: First Amendment Challenges to ITAR,
EAR and Their Successors, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1401, 1413-20 (1997).
28. 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
29. See id. at 3-4.
30. See id. at 4.
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also concluded that because the diskette contained encryption software it was a “defense article” according to the United States Munitions List.31 Karn brought an action in the District Court for Washington D.C. alleging, among other things, that regulation of the
diskette violated his free speech rights.32
According to the decision, Karn claimed the diskette was speech
because it “contain[ed] ‘comments’ interspersed throughout the
source code which are useful only to a human and are ignored by the
computer, and because the source code and comments taken together teach humans how to speak in code.”33 In addressing Karn’s
free speech claim, the court simply assumed the diskette was speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment.34 Even with this generous assumption, the court upheld the constitutionality of ITAR under the O’Brien test because it believed the regulations were content
neutral, were within the constitutional powers of the government,
and were narrowly tailored to an important and substantial government interest.35 Moreover, the court held that Karn improperly requested the court to decide encryption policy—an issue more appropriately resolved by Congress and the President.36 Because the Karn
court simply assumed encryption source code was speech, the remainder of the court’s analysis is not essential to this Note. However, Junger v. Daley,37 the only other pre-Bernstein case to address
the issue, is much more thorough in its analysis than the Karn decision.
2. Junger v. Daley
Peter Junger, a law professor teaching a computer course at Case
Western Reserve University Law School, maintained a website to
which he posted class information and other items of interest to
him.38 Junger wanted to post to his website encryption source code
31. See id.
32. See id. at 3.
33. Id. at 9.
34. See id. (“[T]he Court will assume that the protection of the First Amendment extends to the source code and the comments on the plaintiff’s diskette.” (citations omitted)).
35. See id. at 10-12.
36. See id. at 3. (“This is a ‘political question’ for the two elected branches under Articles I and II of the Constitution.”).
37. 8 F. Supp.2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
38. See id. at 713.
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that he had developed and requested that the Commerce Department determine whether or not such a posting would require a license under ITAR.39 Because under ITAR “almost any posting of
software on the Internet is an export,”40 the Commerce Department
determined, on July 4, 1997, that Junger would need a license.41
Junger brought an action claiming the licensing scheme was an invalid prior restraint on his right to speak freely.42
The court rejected Junger’s arguments and granted the government’s summary judgment motion. In reaching this result, the
Junger court set up a standard that differentiated between expressive
and functional activity.43 In other words, activity with communicative
purposes and characteristics should be protected as speech, but activity intended to perform some nonexpressive function should not be
protected. The “most important issue,” as the court saw it, was
“whether the export of encryption software source code is sufficiently expressive to merit First Amendment protection.”44 The court
did not provide a clear definition of what activity qualified as “sufficiently expressive.” However, it did determine that “inherently expressive. . . . software contains an ‘exposition of ideas,’”45 which
would presumably qualify as sufficiently expressive for free speech
protection. At the same time, the court indicated that “inherently
functional” software would not meet the sufficiently expressive standard.46 The court held that encryption source code was “inherently
functional” and its exportation was not protected by the First
Amendment.47
Of great importance to the court was the purpose behind free
speech protection—the preservation of the political process. “The
protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.”48 But not all human activity can be

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
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Id. at 715-16 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
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protected under the First Amendment: “[S]peech that is ‘so far removed from any exposition of ideas, and from truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the
administration of Government’ lacks First Amendment protection.”49
Based on these principles, the court reasoned that encryption source
code “carries out the function of encryption” rather than “merely
explain[ing] a cryptographic theory or describ[ing] how the software
functions.”50 The court did admit that “encryption source code may
occasionally be expressive,” but “[f]or the broad majority of persons . . ., the value comes from the function the source code does.”51
Because it is “inherently functional” and not “inherently expressive”
from the viewpoint of a “majority of persons,” the court held that
encryption source code did not merit First Amendment protection.
The Bernstein case is the only circuit court decision to address
free speech protection for encryption source code. The decision is
the result of a legal contest that has produced four published opinions,52 is presently under en banc review, and will likely be heard by
the Supreme Court. In each of the published opinions, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California and the
Ninth Circuit have held encryption source code to be speech protected by the First Amendment.

49. Id. at 716 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 715, 716.
52. See Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
[hereinafter Bernstein III]; Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279
(N.D. Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Bernstein II]; and Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of State, 922
F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Bernstein I]. In Bernstein I the court denied the
government’s motion to dismiss for lack of justiciability. In so holding, the court determined
that encryption source code was protected speech. See Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at 1432,
1436. In Bernstein II the court granted Bernstein’s motion for summary judgment and concluded that ITAR was unconstitutional on its face as applied to Bernstein. See Bernstein II, 945
F. Supp. at 1290, 1296. In Bernstein III the court basically issued the same judgment as in
Bernstein II in response to an executive order that changed the ITAR scheme to Export Administration Regulations (EAR) which were also held invalid. See Bernstein III, 974 F. Supp. at
1308. The fourth published decision is authored by the Ninth Circuit and is the principal opinion discussed in this Note.
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III. BERNSTEIN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 53
A. The Facts
As a graduate student at University of California at Berkeley,
Daniel Bernstein developed an encryption program he called “Snuffle.”54 Like other encryption programs, Snuffle was capable of scrambling and unscrambling information so that only certain parties
could understand the information. Bernstein wished to post Snuffle
in source code form to the Internet in order to share his program
with the scientific community.55 Upon Bernstein’s inquiry, the State
Department determined he would need a license to “export” the encryption program.56 “Exportation” under the relevant ITAR and Export Administration Regulations (EAR) provisions includes publishing to the Internet.57
Bernstein filed an action in the Northern District of California alleging, among other things, that the licensing regulations violated
his First Amendment rights. As in Junger, the government argued
that encryption source code was inherently functional and undeserving of free speech protection.58 The government also emphasized the
national security interests furthered by ITAR and EAR:
“[E]ncryption can be used to conceal communications of terrorists,
drug smugglers, or others intent on taking hostile action against
U.S. facilities, personnel, or security interests.”59 Despite the government’s arguments, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s
ruling that Snuffle was protected speech within the meaning of the
First Amendment and that the government’s licensing scheme was
an unconstitutional prior restraint.

53. 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999). The Bernstein decision which is the subject of this
Note was withdrawn for en banc review on September 30, 1999. See 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir.
1999).
54. Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1136.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 1137.
58. See id. at 1142.
59. Id. at 1137 (quoting Lowell Decl. at 4, Appellant’s Excerpts of Record at 97).
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B. The Court’s Reasoning

The Bernstein court reached its determination that encryption
source code is speech in three steps. First, the court emphasized the
expressive characteristics of source code. Second, the court rejected a
test that would deny First Amendment protection to speech that is
both expressive and functional. Third, while the court did not openly
admit its decision was result-oriented, it was arguably motivated by
its disagreement with the policy underlying the encryption regulations.
In its first analytical step, the court emphasized the expressive
characteristics of source code: “The distinguishing feature of source
code is that it is meant to be read and understood by humans and
that it can be used to express an idea or a method.”60 “It must be
emphasized . . . that source code is merely text. . . .”61 While source
code is only text, the court admitted that “only those trained in programming can easily understand” the ideas and methods expressed.62
The court accentuated the expressive elements of source code by
limiting its analysis to the experience of Bernstein and other programmers. For Bernstein and other highly skilled programmers,
source code is a medium that effectively communicates complex
mathematical principles, much like economists’ and mathematicians’
use of graphs.63 Thus, in determining whether source code is expression, the court implicitly excluded the “untutored layperson” who
would use Bernstein’s program without ever understanding its expressive elements.64 After all, “[i]t is Bernstein’s right to speak, not
the rights of foreign listeners to hear, that we are concerned with
here.”65
In contrast, the government emphasized source code’s functional
properties: “[Source code] can be used to control directly the operation of a computer without conveying information to the user.”66
The court countered this argument by distinguishing source code
from object code. Source code, written in computer languages such

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1140 n.11.
See id. at 1140.
See id. at 1141.
See id. at 1140.
Id. at 1139 n.9.
Id. at 1142.
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as Cobalt or C+, cannot operate a computer until converted to object code. A computer program, known as a compiler, translates
source code into object code, which is a series of ones and zeroes arranged so they represent the same computer commands contained in
the source code. The court stated that “ignoring the distinction between source and object code obscures the important fact that
source code is not meant solely for the computer, but is rather written in a language intended also for human analysis and understanding.”67 By emphasizing the differences between source and object
code and limiting its analysis to programmers, the court found encryption source code sufficiently expressive to merit First Amendment protection.
In the second stage of its reasoning, the court criticized “the
government’s argument . . . [which] suggests that even one drop of
‘direct functionality’ overwhelms any constitutional protections that
expression might otherwise enjoy. This cannot be so.”68 It is proper
to reject the “one drop of direct functionality” test, but the court
does not indicate what degree of functionality, if any, will disqualify
an activity from First Amendment protection. The court simply
stated: “[W]e reject the notion that the admixture of functionality
necessarily puts expression beyond the protections of the Constitution.”69 Thus, the court implied that if an activity has only minimal
expressive elements it may still enjoy First Amendment protection.
Interestingly, the Bernstein majority does not mention Junger or address the inherently functional/expressive test set forth in Junger.
The Bernstein dissent, however, relies extensively on Junger.70
The third element of the court’s analysis was its zealous disagreement with the policy judgments behind encryption controls:
the “government is intentionally retarding the progress of the flourishing science of cryptography.”71 After citing numerous examples of
society’s reliance on electronic information storage and communication, the court declared:

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 1149 (Nelson, J. dissenting) (“The Junger decision thus adds considerable
support for the propositions that encryption source code cannot be categorized as pure speech
and that the functional aspects of encryption source code cannot be easily ignored or put
aside.”).
71. Id. at 1145.
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Whether we are surveilled by our government, by criminals, or by
our neighbors. . . never has our ability to shield our affairs from
prying eyes been at such a low ebb. The availability and use of secure encryption may offer an opportunity to reclaim some portion
of the privacy we have lost. . . . [I]t is important to point out that
Bernstein’s is a suit not merely concerning a small group of scientists laboring in an esoteric field, but also touches on the public interest broadly defined.72

By referring to the right to privacy, “the public interest broadly
defined,” and benefits of encryption technology, the court seemed to
be motivated by more than just free speech concerns. Unfortunately,
the Bernstein court does not address the determination made in
Junger that ITAR and EAR licensing provisions were political questions that did not implicate freedom of speech and, therefore, were
not justiciable. Arguably, the Bernstein court used Bernstein’s case to
overrule Executive and Congressional policy and better serve “the
public interest broadly defined.”
IV. ANALYSIS
As explained in Part III.C, the Bernstein court reached its conclusion in three basic steps. Part IV.A pinpoints errors in the court’s
reasoning, concluding that the court should have (1) relied on
O’Brien v. United States and Spence v. Washington and analyzed
Bernstein’s source code from the viewpoint of all affected parties, (2)
relied on City of Dallas v. Stanglin and determined whether Bernstein’s encryption source code represented more than a “kernel of
expression,” and (3) exercised judicial restraint by deferring to policy
determined by the political process. Part IV.B argues that Supreme
Court cases and the utilitarian and libertarian theories support First
Amendment protection for technological speech, but not absolute
protection for all technological activity. Part IV.C argues that the
Bernstein analysis is too broad in its protection of technological activity. Finally, Part IV.D presents a factored test distinguishing between
protected expressive technological activity and unprotected functional technological activity.

72. Id. at 1146 (citations omitted).

677

HANS-FIN.DOC

5/20/00 11:15 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2000

A. Errors in the Court’s Reasoning
1. The court ignored O’Brien and Spence by analyzing source code
from the subjective viewpoint of Bernstein and other programmers
The Bernstein court’s first error is that it analyzed source code
solely from the perspective of Bernstein and other highly-skilled programmers. The Bernstein court’s approach is flawed because it ignores the perspective of the majority of those affected by Bernstein’s
program. The court stated, “It is Bernstein’s right to speak, not the
rights of foreign listeners to hear, that we are concerned with
here.”73 It is difficult to find meaningful limits in this subjective
analysis, for rarely will an individual view an activity for which he is
seeking First Amendment protection as nonexpressive. As the Supreme Court stated in O’Brien: “We cannot accept the view that an
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express
an idea.”74
While the Bernstein court did not use a purely subjective analysis
(the court at least required that other programmers be able to understand the expressive elements of the source code), it still ignored
Spence v. Washington. In that case the Supreme Court stated that in
order for conduct mixed with elements of expression to receive first
amendment protection, “the likelihood [must be] great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it.”75 Unfortunately, the Bernstein court did not apply this principle.
In Bernstein, those who had access to Bernstein’s encryption
source code were Internet users who would download the program.
For these people, the program would have no purpose other than
performing its intended function—to encrypt. Even for programmers
who understand the logarithmic ideas incorporated into source code,
the source code experience is partly expressive and partly functional.
By analyzing it from the perspective of all those who experience it,
source code has an overwhelmingly functional purpose. If the Bernstein court addressed the principles in O’Brien and Spence, it is likely
the encryption source code would not qualify as speech.

73. Id. at 1139 n.9.
74. O’Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
75. 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974).
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2. The court ignored Stanglin by protecting an activity that society
would view as having only a kernel of expression
In City of Dallas v. Stanglin, the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t
is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a
person undertakes—for example, walking down the street or meeting
one’s friends at the shopping mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient
to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.”76 Despite this principle, the Bernstein court seems to have extended free speech protection to an activity that society views as having only a kernel of expression. Because the court did not require
that the encryption program be primarily expressive to be protected,
the court’s holding myopically provided free speech protection to
only partly expressive activity. In doing so, the court contradicted
Stanglin.
Because humans are creatures of will, there is no human activity
that does not contain some measure of expression. Recognizing the
potential danger of its analysis, the Bernstein court tried to “emphasize the narrowness of [its] First Amendment holding” by stating it
“do[es] not hold that all software is expressive.”77 But under the
court’s analysis, there does not seem to be any human-produced
software that cannot communicate some mathematical or methodological idea to another programmer. Thus, the purported narrowness
of the court’s holding is illusory.
3. The court should have exercised judicial restraint and deferred to
political determinations of policy
The Bernstein court’s views on encryption policy are superior to
those reflected in the encryption regulations at issue. ITAR and EAR
unwisely discourage the development of valuable encryption technology because they remove profits earned by exporting the technology. In a world becoming exponentially more dependent on
computers, encryption technology has never been needed more.
As one computer security specialist has said: “There is no such
thing as security, only precaution.”78 Thus, the purpose of computer

76. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
77. Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999).
78. Telephone interview with Alan Wyble, computer security systems specialist (Sept. 2,
1999).
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security is simply to make it too time consuming and expensive for a
hacker to break in. With sensitive and extremely valuable information
available at financial institutions, medical centers, law enforcement
facilities, military bases, and businesses, the need for more advanced
precautionary tools is evident. There have even been reports of military schools specializing in computer warfare.79 And the United
States Office of the Comptroller of Currency recently issued a bulletin warning of “the threats and vulnerabilities created by cyberterrorism to the financial services industry.”80
The above are powerful arguments that government should refrain from hindering encryption technology; however, the Bernstein
court irresponsibly used its judicial role as impartial arbiter to implement its own encryption policy. In reaching its holding, the Bernstein court relied in part on “an opportunity to reclaim some portion
of the privacy we have lost.”81 It seems irresponsible for the Bernstein
court to rely on the right to privacy in determining that encryption
source code is protected speech.
The Karn court saw the free speech argument for what it was:
The plaintiff, in an effort to export a computer diskette for profit,
raises . . . meritless constitutional claims because he and others have
not been able to persuade the Congress and the Executive Branch
that the technology at issue does not endanger the national security. This is a “political question” for the two elected branches under Articles I and II of the Constitution.82

Unlike the Karn court, the Bernstein court concluded differently
because it disagreed with the policy behind encryption regulations
and substituted its judgment for that of Congress and the president.83
79. Computer Security in China, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP. (International Executive
Reports, Ltd.), July 15, 1998. The article cites the China Defense News of October 16, 1998,
where Shen Weiguang, the “Chinese ‘information war’ expert,” notes the rise of information
war specialties in military schools. Id.
80. Cybercrimes: Infrastructure Threats from Cyber-terrorists, CYBERSPACE LAW., Apr.
1999, at 23. Clifford A. Wilke, Office of Comptroller of the Currency director of Bank Technology Division, issued the bulletin on March 5, 1999. The bulletin continued, “OCC’s concern is with how rapidly the threats from terrorists and criminals are evolving in terms of technology, and our banks’ ability to develop and implement adequate preventative controls and
countermeasures.” Id.
81. Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1146 (citations omitted).
82. Karn v. United States Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1996).
83. Karn is not distinguishable from Bernstein on the basis of profit seeking. While
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B. Technological Speech

As we have seen, all forms of communication are not created
equal. For example, opinions regarding public figures receive great
constitutional protection.84 On the other hand, conduct which is not
pure speech but has expressive elements enjoys less constitutional
protection,85 and obscene materials are not protected at all.86 In this
speech protection hierarchy, one wonders what protection technological activity should receive. In order to understand why the Bernstein court applied an inappropriate level of protection to technological activity, we must explore Supreme Court precedent and the
theories supporting free speech.
1. The Supreme Court would probably protect technological speech
under the First Amendment
There is little case law on technological speech. Allen M. Shinn,
Jr., a senior official at the National Science Foundation, stated: “The
Supreme Court has not decided whether scientific speech is protected under the First Amendment.”87 However, the Supreme Court
has recognized the value of scientific speech in various settings. For
example, in the obscenity cases, material that “the ‘average person,
applying contemporary community standards’ would find . . . appeals
to the prurient interest . . . and [is] patently offensive” is still protected under the First Amendment if it does not “lack[] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”88 In other words, even obscene material will be protected if it has serious scientific value. By
placing scientific speech on the same footing as literary, artistic, and

there is no evidence Bernstein wanted to charge money to those who accessed his website, the
success of Bernstein as a scientist and programmer largely turns on his reputation and quality
of work. One cannot seriously contend that Bernstein did not have a professional, and, therefore pecuniary, interest in publishing his work to the Internet.
84. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court held that a public
official cannot prevail on a defamation action unless the defamatory material was published
with actual malice. See id. at 279-80. Thus, speech targeting public officials is more protected
than other speech which is subject to traditional defamation principles.
85. See; City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974); O’Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
86. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
87. Allen M. Shinn, Jr., The First Amendment and the Export Laws: Free Speech on Scientific and Technical Matters, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 368, 378 (1990).
88. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
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political speech, it seems likely that the Supreme Court would protect technological speech.
2. The theories of free speech purposes also support protecting
technological speech
The underlying theories of free speech also support protection of
technological communications. Under the utilitarian theory, one
need only observe the standard of living modern technology has provided to conclude that the theory would protect technological
speech. A strong argument can be made even under the democratic
process strain of the utilitarian theory that technological speech
should be protected because it is a democratizing force. For example,
a common saying on the American western frontier was: “God created men; Colonel Colt made them equal.”89 One instinctively detects the democratizing force of Colt’s six-shooter, also known as the
“Equalizer.” Similarly, Roger Burlingame, has argued that inventors
such as Whitney, Fulton, and McCormick provided the social cohesion that made possible the union envisioned by Lincoln and Webster.90 As James Ferguson has argued: “It seems clear . . . that the social value of technological expression is so substantial that this
category of speech cannot be viewed as warranting less protection
than other forms of expression.”91
The libertarian theory would also support protection of technological speech. As Ferguson also argued, a libertarian theory of “free
expression clearly applies to scientific communications because they
represent the final product in a creative intellectual process. . . . The
personal satisfaction arising from such creative intellectual work accounts for much of the scientist’s interest in a system of free scientific
expression.”92 Similarly, in The Existential Pleasures of Engineering,
Samuel Florman wrote: “The beauty of the machine is pure, like
mathematics. It is also, paradoxically, imbued with the vitality of
humanity, since it is exclusively man-made.”93 Likewise, the great ar89. WILLIAM HOSLEY, COLT: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN LEGEND 66 (1996).
90. See ROGER BURLINGAME, THE MARCH OF THE IRON MEN: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
UNION THROUGH INVENTION 421-36 (1938).
91. James R. Ferguson, Scientific and Technological Expression: A Problem in First
Amendment Theory, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519, 546-47 (1981).
92. Id. at 533, 535.
93. SAMUEL C. FLORMAN, THE EXISTENTIAL PLEASURES OF ENGINEERING 135
(1994).
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chitect Louis Sullivan wrote: “With me. . . architecture is not an art,
but a religion, and that religion but a part of the greater religion of
Democracy.”94 A libertarian theorist will not seriously question the
right of a scientist to express himself under the protection of the
First Amendment.
3. The need for limits on technological activity
Despite these convincing arguments, protection for technological
speech must not be absolute. Under the current free speech paradigm, government can only regulate political speech if it has a “compelling state interest.”95 On the other hand, under O’Brien the government can regulate activity that is not speech if it seeks to further
“an important or substantial interest.”96 Because technological activity would receive far greater protection from government regulation
if it were speech than if it were not speech, a court must be able to
distinguish technological speech from technological activity that is
not speech. For example, if all technological ideas, conduct, and devices were protected speech, the government would be greatly restricted in its ability to impose safety regulations in the auto industry,
precautionary measures on human cloning, safety and export controls on arms, zoning regulations on architecture, and safety measures regulating chemicals and drugs.
Free speech protection exists to protect ideas, not conduct or objects. Because government must be able to regulate conduct and objects to provide safety and order, a court must be able to distinguish
technological conduct and objects from technological expression.
Supreme Court precedent in the “speech-conduct” line supply principles that will help courts distinguish technological speech from
technological conduct and objects. The principles that emerge from
the “speech-conduct” cases are: (1) an actor’s mere intent to communicate an idea cannot transform activity into speech;97 (2) the activity must contain more than a “kernel of expression;”98 and (3) the
likelihood that those who experience the message will understand it

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

JOHN A. KOUWENHOVEN, MADE IN AMERICA 95 (1948) (quoting Louis Sullivan).
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1987) (citations omitted).
O’Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
See id. at 376.
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).

683

HANS-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/20/00 11:15 AM

[2000

must be great.99 Some libertarian theorists severely criticize the
“speech-conduct” approach because it limits an individual’s autonomy and expression.
a. Libertarian considerations. Commenting on the O’Brien case,
which held that burning a draft card was not protected speech, Steven H. Shiffrin stated, “O’Brien is perhaps the ultimate first amendment insult. O’Brien is jailed because the authorities find his manner
of expression unpatriotic, threatening, and offensive. When he complains that his freedom of speech has been abridged, the authorities
deny that he has spoken.”100 Shiffrin raises an important issue: What
constitutes expression and who defines it? For Shiffrin, it seems that
the individual should be the ultimate judge of what qualifies as expression. However, this must not be so. If it were, an individual
could remove his conduct from all laws based on “substantial” interests simply by alleging that his conduct is expressive (only laws based
on a “compelling” government interest would still apply). Even
though some extreme libertarian theorists would support protection
of all activity an actor subjectively views as expressive, such a system
would ultimately jeopardize individual liberty.
According to classical liberalism and social contract theory, a system where each individual delivers a portion of his sovereignty to the
state maximizes individual liberty.101 When individuals choose convention (or law) over unrestrained exercise of individual will (or anarchy), the resultant predictability engenders greater liberty. In this
fundamental sense, the individual is dependent on the whole for lib99. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974).
100. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 81
(1990).
101. Plato describes an ideal state where “each [person] would be his own best guardian.” PLATO, REPUBLIC 42 (G.M.A. Grube trans., C.D.C. Reeve rev., Hackett Publishing 2d
ed. 1992) (ca. 380 B.C.). However, he recognizes that those who “lack power to . . . avoid
suffering [injustice] decide that it is profitable to come to an agreement with each other neither to do injustice nor to suffer it. As a result, they begin to make laws and covenants.” Id.
John Locke also describes the social contract:
Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can
be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his
own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty
and puts on the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other men to join and
unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one
amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater security
against any that are not of it.
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 54 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal
Arts Press 1952) (1690).
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erty. Because the individual derives liberty through submission to society’s rules, a system of unrestricted behavior would be hostile to
individual freedom. If law could not govern individual behavior, the
strong would prey on the weak and society would move closer to a
violent Hobbesian state of nature where the “life of man [is] solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”102 While the libertarian theory gives
great deference to self-expression and individual pursuit of conscience, individual freedom to speak can only survive if it is sensitive
in some degree to society’s definition of speech. If the established
principles of the “speech-conduct” cases are applied to technological
activity, individuals will enjoy greater technological self-expression
than they would in the chaotic condition that would result if government could only regulate conduct for “compelling” purposes.
Like an irrigation canal without any banks, individual expression
cannot exist unless minimally channeled.
b. Utilitarian considerations. The utilitarian theory would reject
any free speech standard that diminishes the utility of technological
speech. A system that protects technological objects and conduct
that society does not view as speech will arguably diminish the utility
of speech.
Thomas Emerson, a utilitarian theorist, stated: “The guiding
principle must be to determine which element is predominant in the
conduct under consideration. Is expression the major element . . .
[o]r is the action the essence?. . . The answer, to a great extent, must
be based on a common-sense reaction. . . .”103 If the judiciary limits
the majority’s ability to pass laws restricting technological conduct
and objects to only those laws furthering “compelling” social interests, the judiciary may lose its institutional legitimacy.104 For example, designers of automobiles and chemical engineers may claim that
the technological objects they produce are protected expression. If
the judiciary protects such activity as speech and only permits the
government to impose regulations furthering a “compelling gov102. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORM, AND POWER OF A
COMMONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL in 3 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS
HOBBES OF MALMESBURY, at 113 (Sir William Molesworth, Bart. ed., 1966) (1651).
103. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 80 (1970).
104. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). One of
the main reasons the Court did not overturn Roe v. Wade was its fear that the nation would
not accept such a decision. The Court stated: “[T]he Court’s legitimacy depends on making
legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.” Id. at 866.
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ernment interest,” it is probable that many safety regulations based
on “substantial interests” will be invalidated. In such cases, it is possible, if not likely, the executive branch will have the political support
to simply ignore such a judicial mandate.105 In such circumstances,
the court’s ability to protect speech would decrease, and the majority
would be less able to benefit from speech once protected by an authoritative judiciary. In essence, a court has the difficult task of protecting minority speech within limits the majority will tolerate. The
court must be sensitive to social mores and choose its battles wisely.
C. The Bernstein Court’s Standard Is Too Broad
In order to qualify for free speech protection under the Bernstein
court’s analysis, one must merely show that the technological expression “is meant to be . . . understood by humans and that it can be
used to express an idea or a method.”106 Furthermore, it must not be
understood by the entire audience, but only by those similarly situated (fellow programmers in Bernstein’s case). This test is too broad
and undermines both the utilitarian and libertarian theories.
Arguably, many other types of technological conduct and devices
would also receive protection under the court’s analysis. For example, architects are paid large sums of money to erect structures communicating ideas such as financial stability, moral responsibility, progress, innovation, chicness, cosmopolitanism, man’s dominion over
nature, or simply eccentricity. Of course, architectural structures also
have functional roles—providing space to live, work, and recreate. At
the same time, an architectural product is expressive, and arguably
much more so than source code. Far more people can understand
the ideas captured in Shreve, Lamb, and Harmon’s Empire State
Building or John Strauss’ Golden Gate Bridge than can understand
the ideas expressed in source code. Similar to source code, architecture reveals scientific ideas, mathematical truths, and methodological
views to other architects. Furthermore, architectural works are more
expressive than source code—they are mythic symbols communicating deep meaning to society at large.

105. In case this scenario seems implausible. The reader will recall that the Supreme
Court suffered severe criticism when it invalidated many New Deal programs. Franklin Roosevelt’s court packing proposal and the “switch in time” are evidence that a powerful political
majority does have the ability to undermine positions the Court takes.
106. Bernstein v. United States Dep’t. of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 1999).
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The Bernstein court’s analysis would also arguably protect the
manufacture of firearms, automobiles, chemicals, drugs, and every
other technological undertaking that would communicate ideas or
methods to specialized technicians. The Bernstein court’s subjective
approach gives rise to the same utilitarian and libertarian critiques of
a purely subjective system described above.107
D. Toward an Expressive/Functional Test
An approach that would better preserve First Amendment privileges and further its purposes is one that distinguishes between protected expressive activity and unprotected functional activity. The
purpose of an expressive/functional test is to distinguish protected
technological expression from unprotected technological conduct
and devices.
1. Proposed expressive/functional test
The core element of this test is whether a reasonable person
within the audience (those likely to actually encounter the activity)
would view the activity as primarily functional or expressive. This test
has roots in the “speech-conduct” cases already cited in this Note
and incorporates three principles: (1) there must be more than the
actor’s mere intent to communicate an idea;108 (2) the activity must
contain more than a “kernel of expression;”109 and (3) the “likelihood [must be] great that the message would be understood by
those who viewed it.”110 If a reasonable person in the audience
would view the activity as expressive, the court will proceed to traditional First Amendment analysis. If the activity would be viewed as
primarily functional, it is not speech within the meaning of the First
Amendment.
This test will undoubtedly tax even the most capable jurist. Admittedly, all human activity contains functional and expressive elements. Even oral or written speech is partly functional and must be
so in a physical world (sound waves create physical impressions on
ear drums, and photons stimulate retinas). However, the law must
recognize that a distinction between primarily functional and primar107.
108.
109.
110.

See supra Part IV.B.3.
See O’Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974).
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ily expressive activity is not only necessary but also possible. Several
factors are helpful in making this determination.
The factors to be used in determining whether an activity is primarily functional or expressive are: (1) the nature of the medium
used, (2) the composition and scope of the audience, and (3) the extent to which physical objects involved in the activity represent an
idea or reduce human labor. These factors are not weighted and
serve merely as guidelines to the court. This approach is designed to
offer the flexibility needed in the slippery realm of freedom of speech
analysis and provide enough structure to discourage result-oriented
decisions. Of course, a stubborn court will doubtlessly be able to engage in result-oriented decision making, but this test will generally
discourage such decisions. A deeper exploration of these factors will
reveal the strengths, and perhaps the weaknesses, of this test.
a. The nature of the medium. Choice of medium often affects the
composition of an actor’s audience (for example, publishing to the
Internet instead of e-mailing). A medium’s effect on the size and
composition of an audience and, hence, an audience’s ability to understand a message is treated in the next section.111 The choice of
medium also affects the expressive nature of a message.112 For example, communication in a language both parties understand is more
expressive than communication in a language neither party understands well.113 Ceteris paribus, if an actor uses a medium that is less
expressive than other media, an inference arises that the actor is more
concerned with functional aspects of the activity in question.114
For example, the Bernstein court points to “blueprints, recipes,
and ‘how-to’ manuals” as expressive media with functional elements.115 If one wishes to communicate to another the process
whereby one makes a car, a how-to manual will be more expressive
than a finished automobile. In the latter instance, it will be presumed
111. See infra PartIV.C.1.b.
112. See generally MARSHALL MCLUHAN, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE (1967). “Societies have always been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men communicate
than by the content of the communication.” Id. at 8.
113. See, e.g., infra note 114 and accompanying text.
114. Ceteris paribus is a Latin term meaning “other things being equal.” WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 368 (1971). Admittedly, this is an argument similar to that made in the time, place, and manner context. Because this Note addresses the problem of how to define speech, and not what level of protection qualifying speech should receive,
a thorough discussion of time, place, and manner principles is best left for another day.
115. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 1999).
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that the party furnishing the finished automobile is more concerned
with functional aspects of the automobile than communicating the
process of making an automobile.
b. The composition and scope of the audience. Actors generally have
control over the scope and composition of their audience. Suppose
an actor desires to communicate to a specific audience that will universally understand his message. If the actor uses a medium that increases the size and alters the composition of the audience such that
most of the audience does not understand the intended message,
then there is an inference that the activity is primarily functional and
not expressive.
For example, an actor who publishes a computer program to the
Internet in an attempt to make it available to programmers (for
whom he also has e-mail addresses), is less concerned with speech
than an actor who simply e-mails the program to his programmer
friends. This factor helps determine the intent of the actor, but the
audience’s perception of the activity is the chief concern. An actor’s
intent to communicate cannot by itself transform an audience’s perception of an activity from functional to expressive. An actor can increase the availability of free speech protections by narrowing his audience to those who will understand the message.
c. The extent to which the object represents an idea or reduces
physical human labor. Every expressive activity involves some physical
object, such as paper, air molecules, or sound waves. However, the
purpose of free speech is to protect ideas not objects. Objects are
only protected to the extent they represent ideas or are immediately
connected to the communication of ideas. For example, while paper
does not generally represent ideas, it is essential to the expression of
ideas in writing. Free speech principles would protect the use of paper to the extent it is used to communicate ideas. However, if paper
towels are used to mop up spilt milk, the paper is not being used to
communicate ideas but to reduce the human labor needed to clean
up spills. Of course, all technology reduces human labor to some extent, thereby theoretically giving individuals more time to think and
exchange ideas. However, an object’s connection with expression
must be close and immediate in order to be protected under free
speech principles. What is more, minimal human involvement to facilitate the object’s purpose should not affect a determination of
functionality or expressiveness.
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For example, even though an automobile is not functional until a
human starts it, turning a key in an ignition should not detract from
an automobile’s functionality. Likewise, pressing a button to convert
source code to object code should not significantly affect a determination of its expressiveness or functionality. At the same time, an object’s ability to perform incidental work should not affect its expressive nature. For example, Michelangelo’s statue of David should not
be characterized as functional because it can be used as a bird perch.
In each circumstance, the court should determine the most natural
purpose of the object from the audience’s point of view.
2. The expressive/functional test furthers the purposes of free speech
As we have seen, the fundamental purpose of freedom of speech
is to protect minority expression from possible oppression by the collective strength of a majority. According to the two prevalent theories of free speech, minority speech should be protected as a means
to preserve democracy and thus prevent the majority from harming
itself (utilitarian theory), and because expression of one’s ideas is an
end in itself (libertarian theory). Both theories require that courts
fashion a standard of free speech that protects the minority’s ability
to speak but also caution that extending speech protection too far
ultimately jeopardizes freedom of speech.
The expressive/functional test limits actions protected under
freedom of speech within bounds society will tolerate, and by so doing ensures the continued vitality of an individual’s right to express
conscience. The test accomplishes this goal in two fundamental ways.
First, the test separates functional activity from expressive activity
(something the Bernstein court does not do) and thereby excludes
nonspeech activity from protection. Secondly, the test provides a partially objective standard in making the distinction between functional
and expressive activity—the test employs the viewpoint of a reasonable audience member. By employing a partially subjective standard
(the viewpoint of a reasonable audience member instead of a reasonable member of society), the expressive/functional test still protects
the individual from oppressive majorities. With these two precautions
in place, it is more likely the judiciary will protect its legitimacy in
the eyes of the public and, therefore, preserve its power to enforce
free speech principles. Furthermore, political processes will better resolve tension between segments of society, and a greater sense of
community will engender greater individual liberty. By protecting
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individual activity within limits the majority will tolerate, the expressive/functional test successfully serves the dual purposes of speech
protection. It remains to be seen how exportation of encryption
source code over the Internet will hold up under this test.
3. Application of the expressive/functional test to the facts in Bernstein
The first factor is the actor’s choice of medium. The court emphasized the differences between source code and object code,
pointing out that source code could not actually perform any function until compiled into object code.116 This is an insignificant distinction. The same argument could be made by stating that an
automobile is more expressive than functional because one must turn
the ignition key before it starts; thus only a running automobile is
functional. Under this factor, it is clear that encryption source code is
a medium with functional characteristics. It is also clear that source
code is an expressive medium because programmers use it to express
complex mathematical ideas to other programmers. Because the use
of a functional medium creates a presumption that the actor is more
concerned with function than with expression, the crucial determination is whether source code is the least functional medium by which
Bernstein can convey his message.
If Bernstein simply wished to express mathematical principles, he
could surely do it on paper. By using source code, one purpose of
which is to control a computer, Bernstein was doing more than simply conveying mathematical ideas. At the very least, he wanted to
convey mathematical ideas in the context of encryption programming. More likely, Bernstein wanted to promote encryption technology by providing an encryption program to other programmers
and computer users. This indicates Bernstein’s purpose was not only
to comment on encryption as an abstract academic problem but also
to provide a device to be used in practical situations. In essence,
Bernstein said: “Fellow programmers, here is a good encryption program. What do you think?” The most effective, and perhaps only,
way to communicate this message was to provide the actual program.
Any other medium would not have the same effectiveness as being
able to see the program actually work on a computer. Under this

116. See id.
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factor, Bernstein probably could not have used a less functional medium to convey the same message.
The next factor is the scope and composition of the audience and
its ability to understand the message. The majority of people accessing Bernstein’s program on the Internet would not understand its
expressive elements. While it would be impossible (and perhaps an
invasion of privacy) to know the identities of each Internet user accessing Bernstein’s site, it is likely the majority of the actual audience
would be nonprogrammers interested in the functional use of Bernstein’s encryption program. Bernstein could have restricted his audience to programmers by providing access instructions on his Internet
site only those who understood source code could follow. He also
could have distributed the program by e-mail to those within his
academic circle or solicited programmers’ e-mail addresses on his
web site. Because Bernstein made the program available to an audience that he knew would, for the most part, only understand its
function, this factor indicates that the program is primarily functional.
Finally, Bernstein’s encryption source code is a tool capable of
performing the function of encryption. Bernstein’s program would
greatly reduce the amount of human labor needed to encrypt. Such
work is not incidental to any expressive purpose, thus indicating that
the program is primarily functional. Furthermore, this interpretation
of Bernstein’s program is not unnatural.
After exploring these factors, it is likely that a reasonable member
of the audience would view publishing encryption source code to the
Internet as primarily functional. Therefore, Bernstein’s source code
should not qualify as speech within the ambit of the First Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
The Bernstein court ignores important principles in Supreme
Court “speech-conduct” precedents. It does so by redefining free
speech protection to encompass any activity with only minor elements of expression. Because all human activity is imbued with elements of expression, the court’s free speech formulation will open a
Pandora’s Box. Free speech claims will inundate the courts, but more
importantly, the Bernstein decision endangers long-term free speech
protection. Such a condition will ultimately discredit the courts and
undermine the purposes of freedom of speech.
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The expressive/functional test advanced in this Note is consistent with the principles embodied in “speech-conduct” precedent
because it bases the distinction between expression and function on
the viewpoint of a reasonable member of the audience, not the subjective view of the individual actor. By basing the distinction between functional and expressive activity on the views of the audience,
rather than on the subjective views of the actor, the expressive/functional test preserves social order while permitting individual
liberty. Such a balance most adequately protects the freedom to
voice one’s conscience in a democratic society.
Seth Hanson

693

